On Costs and Benefits of Russia's Participation in the Kyoto Protocol by Digas, B. et al.
On Costs and Benefits of Russia's 
Participation in the Kyoto Protocol
Digas, B., Maksimov, V.I. and Schrattenholzer, L.
IIASA Interim Report
July 2009
 
Digas, B., Maksimov, V.I. and Schrattenholzer, L. (2009) On Costs and Benefits of Russia's Participation in the Kyoto 
Protocol. IIASA Interim Report. IR-09-001 Copyright © 2009 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/9147/ 
Interim Report on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
 International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis 
Schlossplatz 1 
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria 
Tel: +43 2236 807 342
Fax: +43 2236 71313
E-mail: publications@iiasa.ac.at
Web: www.iiasa.ac.at
 
 
 
Interim Reports on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only
limited review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the
Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other organizations supporting the work. 
Interim Report IR-09-001 
On Costs and Benefits of Russia’s Participation in the Kyoto 
Protocol 
 
Boris Digas (digas@imm.uran.ru) 
Vyacheslav Maksimov (maksimov@imm.uran.ru) 
Leo Schrattenholzer † 
 
Approved by 
Arkady Kryazhimskiy 
Leader, Dynamic Systems Program 
July, 2009 
 
 
 ii
Foreword 
This paper is the last IIASA publication by Leo Schrattenholzer, the initiator of the project 
presented here and leader of the research group. 
 
The project was launched in 2003, when Russia, one of the biggest players in the global 
emission reduction process, was not participating in the Kyoto Protocol, and strong 
debates about potential costs of its participation and benefits from it were frequently 
emerging among politicians and among scientists with different scientific backgrounds. 
These debates were supported by numerous research efforts, especially in Russia. The 
authors used diverse methodologies and produced a wide spectrum of estimates and policy 
recommendations.  
 
At that time, Leo Schrattenholzer, Leader of IIASA’s Environmentally Compatible Energy 
Strategies (ECS) Program, suggested that IIASA, an independent international research 
center, should contribute to this hot scientific discussion using its own instruments and 
bringing a stronger spirit of systems analysis to it. A research group consisting of members 
of the ECS and DYN Programs and also representatives of IIASA’s network of applied 
mathematicians, started  to work on this. An important point in this collaborative activity 
was a meeting in the Russian Academy of Sciences in May 2005, in which the members of 
the project team presented their preliminary results to a group of Russian experts; a key 
observation was that Russia would hardly meet its Kyoto emission level before the year 
2020 under a range of economic assumptions, which seemed quite realistic in that “pre-
crisis” period. 
 
The project was essentially finished by the end of 2006. However, some important 
research components, including parts of sensitivity analysis, were still missing, and the 
group continued its research effort, in a slower mode and in another format, in which ECS 
was no longer in IIASA’s agenda and Leo Schrattenholzer was no longer affiliated with 
IIASA. 
 
In the course of real economic development (passing through today’s economic crises), the 
medium-term growth scenarios assumed in the project (as well as in a number of other 
earlier studies) never came to reality, and the generated emission projections for Russia 
had no chance to be proven or rejected. However, a methodological value of this research, 
which includes a strong modeling effort, an extended numerical sensitivity analysis, and a 
comparison with alternative estimates remains high and can, principally, be used in new 
IIASA projects connected to the Post-Kyoto process.    
 
Since July 2008, the group has been selecting and putting together material for this paper. 
In March 2009, Leo Schrattenholzer wrote the Introduction and Section 2 (Recent 
development of  Russia’s E3 System). He passed away unexpectedly in April, and did not 
see this paper published. I have dared to edit the rest of the text stylistically and slightly 
reshuffle it, in the hope that this small editorial effort of mine would help to represent 
Leo’s vision of this work in a clearer way – a way which was always in the spirit of 
systems analysis. 
 
 
Arkady Kryazhimskiy – June, 2009 
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Abstract 
 
The authors consider an application of MERGE, a large-scale non-linear optimization 
model, to the analysis of the development of the E3 (energy-economy-environment) 
system in Russia. A brief historical overview is followed by a short outline of related 
studies performed earlier by Russian research institutions. Original MERGE-based 
development scenarios for Russia are described. The simulation results are presented in 
detail and then partially compared with the projections given by other authors. The results 
of a sensitivity analysis of the model’s outputs are presented.   
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1  Introduction 
 
According to the Kyoto Protocol of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
signed at the Third Conference of Parties, in Kyoto, Japan, in December, 1997, the 
developed industrial countries must reduce their emissions of six greenhouse gases 
(GHG) in the period 2008–2012 by at least 5% from 1990 levels. Each Party to the 
Kyoto Protocol is assigned with an individual emission limit that must not be exceeded. 
In particular, the 15 Member States (as of 1997) of the European Union have a target of 
reducing their emissions by 8%; the USA by 7%; Japan and Canada by 6% each. 
Russia’s emissions ceiling is set at the 1990 level. 
 
Following intensive and heated public discussions, the President of the Russian 
Federation signed the Federal Law “On the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change” on 4 November 2004. This 
law led to the ratification of the Protocol by Russia, which in turn led to the Protocol 
coming into force on 16 February 2005.  
 
The work reported here was initiated before the Russian decision to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol (KP). The aim was to provide a numerical and reproducible basis for the 
decision by estimating the economic consequences, costs or benefits, of Russia being 
bound by the limits stipulated in the KP. 
 
In this respect, the work reported here can of course no longer serve the original 
purpose. The authors have nonetheless decided to publish this paper, mainly for two 
reasons. First, the scenarios developed with the Integrated Assessment (IA) model 
MERGE have been updated to the latest available information, that is, the information 
as of mid-2008
1
. The second – methodological – reason is that we believe that the work 
for Russia demonstrates the usefulness of MERGE for analyzing economic costs and 
benefits of environmental agreements in a large number of situations. 
 
                                                 
1 The Global Economic Crisis – under this name – became a major global concern in late 2008. At the 
time of this writing, the hope can still be entertained that after the end of the crisis, GDP development will 
“catch up” again, at least to some extent. In particular, given the strong methodological focus of this 
paper, the authors see no reason to change the future growth rates of potential economic growth. After all, 
also the oil price trajectories in the model are still the same as in 2006 despite the obvious possibility that 
they could have been considered very wrong at some point in between. 
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One peculiarity of the projections of the future evolvement of the Russian E3 (energy-
economy-environment) system is that many variables used to portray this evolvement 
span rather wide ranges over the projection period, usually reaching to the year 2050. 
While it is of course acknowledged that major uncertainties surround any such 
projection, it appears unsatisfactory to simply take this situation as being the norm  and 
for granted. In our opinion what should be done is that the different projections – in 
particular those on the high and low ends of the spectrum – should be qualified by 
identifying necessary and/or sufficient conditions under which each of the scenarios 
appears particularly plausible. This way, readers are in a position to form their 
subjective probabilities not solely on abstract ranges but also on sets of circumstances 
(so-called scenario variables), which may include variables better amenable to 
estimating probabilities and plausibility. 
 
As an instrument for making the necessity or sufficiency of conditions plausible, we 
selected the MERGE model (Manne and Richels, 2004), one of the most well-known 
and widely accepted E3 models.  
 
As a basis for our model-based analysis we first review Russia’s current GHG 
emissions and their determinants in Section 2.  
 
In Section 3, we discuss some background for our research – the future projections for 
Russia’s E3 system, suggested by several Russian experts in the period preceding 
Russia’s participation in the Kyoto Protocol; we notice, in particular, a visible 
diversification in the experts’ estimates of the time, at which Russia’s emissions will 
reach the level of 1990 – the Kyoto level for Russia. This diversification has motivated 
our research from a methodological perspective; in our study, we assess the experts’ 
estimates using a global E3 model.  
 
In Section 4, we first summarize the MERGE model and its variant MERGE-5I (‘I’ as 
in IIASA) to the extent we deem necessary to understand the scenarios and conclusions 
presented later. We then present our MERGE-based results and compare them with 
earlier experts’ projections for Russia’s E3 system.  
 
In Section 5, we analyze the sensitivity of the model outcomes to variations in the 
values of the major parameters of Russia’s economy. 
2   Recent development of Russia’s E3 system  
2.1  Background 
After the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, its integrated fuel and energy complex, 
a part of centralized Soviet economy, was subject to major structural changes. In 
addition, the fall of the “iron curtain” has made a significant intrusion into the 
economies of all successor states. For almost a decade, Russia’s Gross Domestic 
Product was steeply decreasing. Only in 1998 it began to rise again – from a level 
corresponding to 57% of 1990’s GDP. Since then, GDP growth has been continuing at 
increasing rates, thus giving cause for expecting further economic growth. 
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Along with the stabilization of the economy and the sustained increase of economic 
output, Russia is facing new challenges, for example, the issue of physical obsolescence 
of energy-related physical capital, in particular infrastructures built during Soviet times, 
is of increasing importance. Since one of the most important driving forces of Russian 
economic growth is the production, consumption, and export of crude oil and natural 
gas, the maintenance of existing and the construction of new pipelines are among the 
most crucial issues. 
 
Also, the Soviet Union’s emphasis on heavy industrial production and little regard for 
the environment has left Russia with numerous environmental problems, from severe air 
pollution to radioactive contamination. Although numerous factories and heavy industry 
were shut down in the economic contraction in 90s, the country still has an economy 
that is heavily reliant on energy-intensive industries. Furthermore, Russia’s ongoing 
transition to a market economy has led the government to promote economic growth 
rather than environmental protection. Yet, the environment is certainly a more pertinent 
issue in today’s Russia than it was even 10 years ago. Such improvement can be 
supported – among other measures – by the country’s Environmental Protection Law 
and the Law on Ecological Expert Review (both passed after the break-up of the USSR) 
and participation in the international environmental agreements (such as the Kyoto 
Protocol and the Methane to Markets Partnership). 
2.2  History 
The dynamics of greenhouse gas emissions in Russia presented in the Third and Fourth 
National Communications of the Russian Federation (TNC RF, FNC RF) [4, 5] (see 
also [1, 12]) show a significant reduction of GHG emissions over this period (of 1990–
2004) – nearly 30% without account of land use and forestation (see, Figure 1). If taking 
the sinks from land use and forestation into account, the reduction reaches 45% by 
2004. Here we used the main estimates presented in 4, 5]. 
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Figure 1: Greenhouse-gas emissions in Russia, 1990–2004, million tons of 
CO2 equivalent (MtCO2-equ.) without account of land use and forestation. 
Source: [4, 5]. 
 
The shares of the six greenhouse gases in Russia correspond to those in most of 
industrialized countries: Nearly 78% is carbon dioxide, 14% methane, 5.7% nitrous 
oxide, and 2.3% fluorides. 
 
Nearly 98% of direct anthropogenic CO2 emissions are connected with the production, 
transport and use of fossil fuels, the remaining 2% originating from industry, mainly 
cement production. Conversely, CO2 emissions from the beneficial use (combustion) of 
fossil fuel are about 99% of the total emissions related to fossil fuel. The remaining 
1.2% originates from flaring and waste. The shares of CO2 emissions from usage of 
fossil fuels are 50.8% from natural gas, 23.9% from oil, and 25.3% from coal. These 
shares differ from the world averages, which are 19.2%, 42.7% and 38.1% respectively. 
The large share of gas in the primary-energy balance of Russia is caused by active gas 
installation in urban areas in the last 30 years, by growth of gas usage in industry and 
for power generation as well as by significant increases in production in newly 
developed gas fields. 
 
Russia’s methane emissions are mainly caused by leakage during extraction, 
transportation and refining of petroleum and gas, by mining gas seepage, by livestock 
farming, by waste processing and disposal, as well as by forest fires. The nitrous oxide 
emissions are caused predominantly (almost 80%) by agriculture (fertilizer application); 
nearly 10% is connected with liquid wastes and 9% with fossil-fuel usage. 
 
The main sources of fluorides (hydrofluorcarbons – HFCs, perfluorocarbons – PFCs, 
and sulfur hexafluoride – SF6) emissions are the branches of industry connected with 
production of coolants, solvents and aerosols. SF6 escapes during industrial processing 
of minerals (fluorites) and in high-voltage power engineering. PFCs escape in large 
amounts during production of aluminum. 
 
The pattern of GHG emissions in Russia is represented by a number of source 
categories (Figure 2). The leading role in GHG emissions belongs to fossil fuel 
0
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combustion (about 80% of total emissions).The share of large stationary energy sources 
(thermoelectric power stations, power objects at industrial plants) is above 50% of a 
country’s total GHG emissions. 
 
Figure 2: GHG emission pattern in Russia by source categories, 1990–2004, 
MtCO2-equ. Negative values mean GHG absorption (sinks). 
Source: [5]. 
Table 1 shows estimates for Russia’s CO2 emission from fuel combustion. 
Contributions of individual gases to Russia’s total emissions are given in Table 2, and in 
Figure 3, which shows that despite a drastic change of the total emission value between 
1990, 1998 and 2004 the shares changed only slightly.  
 
Table 1: Russia’s energy-related GHG emissions in 1990, 1998 and 2000–2004, in Mt 
of CO2 equivalent.  Source: [5]. 
 
Source and gas 
Emissions, MtCO2-eq p.a.  
1990 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Fuel combustion, СO2 2.193 1.488 1.501 1.527 1.495 1.540 1.754 
Fuel combustion, Сɇ4 0.188 0.119 0.121 0.123 0.125 0.128 0.127 
Fuel combustion, N2O 0.017 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 
Processing emissions 
and leakage, СO2 19.346 12.994 13.954 14.182 21.250 20.742 24.255 
Processing emissions 
and leakage, Сɇ4 11.668 7.595 8.121 8.046 8.092 8.473 8.697 
Processing emissions 
and leakage, N2O 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
‐1,000
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
1990 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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Table 2: Russia’s industry-related GHG emissions in 1990, 1998 and 2000–2004, in Mt 
of carbon equivalent.  Source: [5]. 
 
Source and gas 
Emissions, MtCO2-eq p.a. 
1990 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Processing of minerals, СO2 41.606 16.464 20.939 21.861 23.200 24.967 27.420 
Chemical industry, СO2 19.102 12.064 16.079 15.999 15.863 16.743 18.062 
Chemical industry, Сɇ4 0.063 0.019 0.028 0.032 0.034 0.040 0.043 
Chemical industry, N2O 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.016 
Metallurgy, СO2 9.865 3.816 4.319 3.867 3.913 4.821 5.159 
Metallurgy, fluorine-containing 
gases 
30.449 31.411 33.842 34.518 34.864 36.258 37.709 
Production and consumption of 
fluorine-containing gases 
8.031 9.474 10.128 10.134 10.139 10.144 10.148 
Utilization of  solvents and other 
products, N2O 
0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The distribution of the total equivalent emission  
among greenhouse gases in Russia in 1990, 1998 and 2004 (%). 
Sources: [4] (1990, 1998), [5] (2004). 
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3  Projections by Russian agencies  
3.1  Brief overview 
Medium- and long-term projections of Russia’s economic development have been 
performed by several research centers in Russia. These include the Bureau for 
Economic Analysis [12], the Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences [6], the Russian Regional Environmental Center [3], and others. The 
projections suggest diverging results. According to some estimates, even under 
pessimistic scenarios for energy intensity (in which Russia’s economic growth is still 
based on old technologies), Russia’s emissions of greenhouse gases will not exceed the 
1990 values within the first Kyoto Commitment Period (2008–2012) and thus remain 
within the “Kyoto limits”. Other results assert the contrary. To illustrate a 
diversification of the experts’ estimates, in this section we provide a brief overview of 
the results by the Russian Regional Environmental Center, the Third National 
Communication of the Russian Federation, and the Institute of Economic Analysis in 
Moscow. Note that these studies had been performed before Russia has joined the 
Kyoto Protocol, in a period in which many Russian scientists and politicians had been 
involved in strong debates about the costs and benefits for Russia from its participation 
in the Kyoto Protocol. 
3.2  Projections based on Russia’s official energy strategy till 2020 
One of the forecasts was performed by the Russian Regional Environmental Center 
(RREC) [3] on the basis of the “Energy Strategy of Russia till 2020” approved by the 
Government of the Russian Federation [13]. The reference assumptions of this Strategy, 
concerning the economic growth dynamics of Russia are represented in Figure 4. 
According to these assumptions, the country’s GDP will increase by a factor of 
approximately two between 2000 and 2012. The RREC’s long-term forecast on 
production and consumption of primary energy resources in Russia is represented in 
Figure 5. The pattern of production and consumption of primary fuel-energy resources 
in Russia and medium-term GHG emission projection corresponding to these forecasts 
are illustrated in Figures 6 and 7.  
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Figure 4: Basic assumptions on the development of Russia’s economy until 2020, 
approved by the Government of the Russian Federation on 28 August, 2003.  
Source: [13]. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Medium-term projections for production and consumption 
 of primary energy in Russia by the Russian Regional Environmental Center,  
in Gt of coal equivalent (Gtce). 
 Source: [3]. 
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Figure 6: Long-term projections for pattern of production and consumption of primary 
energy in Russia by the Russian Regional Environmental Center.  
Source: [3]. 
 
Figure 7: Medium-term GHG emission forecast for Russia  
by the Russian Regional Environmental Center.  
Source: [3].  
 
Note that RREC’s emission projections (see Figure 7) show that Russia’s emissions will 
remain below the level of 1990 till 2020, which corresponds with our simulation results.  
3.3 Other projections from Russian sources 
A significant amount of emission estimates for Russia rests upon the Third National 
Communication of the Russian Federation (TNC-RF) [4] approved by the Inter-Agency  
Commission of the Russian Federation on Climate Change
2
. 
                                                 
2 The National Communication has been prepared under specific provisions of the specially developed 
Federal Target Programme “Prevention of Dangerous Changes of Climate and Their Adverse Effects”, 
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The main assumptions used in TNC-RF and based on the Energy Strategy of Russia 
described in the previous subsection are the following (here we follow [4]): 
 
a) In Scenario I, Russia’s GDP is expected to grow by a factor of 3–3.15 (corresponding 
to an average annual growth rate of 5.0–5.2%) between 2001 and 2020 as a 
consequence of an assumed favorable overall development of its economy. In parallel 
with Scenario I, Scenario II and Scenario III assuming lower GDP growth rates (3.3% 
and 4.5% per year on average, respectively) are considered. Scenario III follows a 
statement from the Second National Communication of the Russian Federation, which 
suggests that there is a certain probability for approximately 4.5% annual GDP growth 
along with a 2% average annual decrease in the energy intensity of GDP.  
 
b) In Scenario I, it is assumed that available investments into efficiency improvements 
of the energy sector will suffice to introduce all measures as planned by the Russian 
government under the Federal Target Programme. In this case, during the period 2001–
2020 the energy intensity of GDP can be reduced by a factor of 2.1 (corresponding to an 
average annual decline rate of 3.7%). Under less favorable conditions, this rate can be 
as low as 2.5% per year or 2.0% per year as assumed in Scenario II and in Scenario III, 
respectively. 
 
c) The carbon index of energy demand (the ratio of CO2 emissions to the total domestic 
energy resources consumption) is determined by the expected evolution of the country’s 
primary-energy mix. According to the Energy Strategy [13], by the year 2020, the share 
of gas in primary-energy consumption will decrease from 48% to 42–45%; the share of 
oil will be stable over this period (22–23%); the share of coal will increase from 20% to 
21–23%; the share of nuclear power will grow to 5.7–6.0%; and the share of non-
conventional renewable energy sources (such as solar, wind, geothermal, biomass) will 
increase to 1.1–1.6%. Thus, in spite of a decrease in the gas share and an increase in the 
coal share, the carbon index of energy demand is expected to be approximately constant 
over the time period in question due to an increase in the share of carbon-free power 
sources.  
 
Table 3 summarizes detailed characterizations of the scenarios.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
authorized by the approval of the Government of the Russian Federation of October 19, 1996, with the 
purpose of implementation of the commitments under the UN FCCC and prevention of negative 
consequences of climate change on the health of population and on the national economy. Information for 
National Communication has been submitted by nearly forty ministries, agencies, institutions, and 
institutes of Russia. 
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Table 3: Growth rates for the major drivers of Russia’s domestic energy demand and 
CO2 emissions in 2001–2020 according to TNC-RF (% per year).  Source: [4] 
 
 
 Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III 
GDP growth rate 
 
5.2%  3.3%  4.5%  
Energy efficiency 
improvement rate  
3.7%  2.5%  2.0%  
 
 
 
Figure 8: CO2 emission projections for Russia for TNC-RF’s scenarios (1990 = 100%). 
Source: [4]. 
 
Russia’s projected CO2 emissions for three TNC-RF’s scenarios are given in Figure 8. 
The figure shows that even in the worst of the TNC-RF’s scenarios, the 1990 CO2 
emission level will not be exceeded before 2015, which, principally, agrees with the 
RREC’s forecast depicted in Figure 7. 
 
A different view is taken by the Institute of Economic Analysis (IEA) in Moscow 
considering four GDP growth scenarios for Russia. IEA’s estimates [2] are summarized 
in Table 4 and in Figure 9. 
 
Table 4: IEA’s forecasts for the times of exceeding the 1990 level of CO2 emission by 
Russia.  Source: [2]  
 
 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
GDP growth rate 5.0%  6.2% 6.7% 7.2%  
Energy efficiency 
improvement rate 
2.0%  2.0% 2.0% 2.0%  
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We see that under the assumption that Russia’s GDP growth rate remains relatively high 
whereas the energy efficiency improvement rate remains relatively low, the IEA’s 
experts expect Russia to exceed the 1990 level of carbon dioxide emissions before the 
end of the First Kyoto Commitment Period – the year 2012. 
 
 
Figure 9: Actual (1990–2003) and projected by IEA (2004–2020) CO2 emissions in 
Russia for four GDP growth scenarios  
Source: [2] 
3.4 Summary on experts’ estimates 
Although the studies outlined above deal with various aspects of the development of 
Russia’s E3 system in a medium-term prospect, the Kyoto Protocol constraints play a 
central role in all of them. A key question addressed in all these studies is whether 
Russia will exceed its 1990 level of carbon dioxide emissions before the end of the First 
Kyoto Commitment period – the year 2012. 
  
The Russian Regional Environmental Center (RREC), following the official “Energy 
Strategy of Russia till 2020”, states that Russia’s carbon dioxide emissions will remain 
below the level of 1990 till 2020.  
 
The Third National Communication of the Russian Federation (TNC-RF), considering 
three medium-term scenarios for Russia’s economic development, comes to the 
conclusion that Russia will exceed the 1990 emission level not earlier than in the year 
2015.  
 
Finally, the Institute of Economic Analysis (IEA) in Moscow has found that Russia will 
exhibit a relatively high rate of economic growth and a relatively low energy efficiency 
improvement rate and can exceed the 1990 level of emissions around the year 2010.  
 
In the next section, while presenting the results of our research, we will also refer to the 
estimates suggested by the Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of 
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Sciences, which will be closer to those by RREEC and TNC-RF rather than those by 
IEA.  
 
The diversification of the estimates provided by different Russian experts (which vary 
from, roughly, 2020 to 2010) has appealed for assessing these domestic estimates by 
using tools elaborated for analysis of the global E3 system, in which Russia acts as one 
of the parties. 
 
This challenge has motivated our research. We used the global E3 MERGE model to 
generate future projections for Russia’s E3 system. To complement the studies outlined 
above, our simulations show in particular, that only strongly pessimistic scenarios of 
economic development can admit that Russia exceeds its 1990 level of carbon dioxide 
emissions before the end of the First Kyoto Commitment Period. 
  
The next two sections present our results. 
4 MERGE-based Analysis of E3 Scenarios for Russia 
 
4.1 The MERGE-5I Model 
The selection of the model was preceded by a comprehensive review of the existing 
integrated assessment models, which could be used in the projected exercise. For this 
purpose the authors have reviewed over 30 world-known models and chose the MERGE 
model developed in the mid-1990s (a Model for Evaluating Regional and Global Effects 
of GHG reduction policies) [7, 8]. MERGE provides an IA (Integrated Assessment) 
framework for studying scenarios of the interaction between the economy, the energy 
system, and climate change. The model is very well suited to explore – in a quantitative 
and reproducible way – alternative views on a range of issues, e.g. costs, damages, 
valuation, and discounting. The purpose of using MERGE is to reflect these alternative 
views by sets of model inputs, one at a time. The last version of the MERGE model – 
MERGE-5 [9] – was modified by the ECS Program at IIASA. This resulted in the 
creation of a new model version, named MERGE-5I (‘I’ stands for ‘IIASA’) [10].  
 
The global-optimization model MERGE [9] describes the interaction between 
macroeconomic production, the energy system (demand and supply), pollutant 
emissions, and climate change. The model consists of three logical parts: a 
macroeconomic module, an energy supply part, and a climate module. It combines a 
top-down description of the economy and energy demand with a bottom-up description 
of the energy sector. 
 
The macroeconomic module defines an inter-temporal utility function of a single 
representative producer-consumer in each of the model’s world regions, which is then 
maximized by MERGE subject to given constrains. The main variables of this module 
are the production factors capital stock (K), available labor (L), and energy inputs 
(electric, EN, and non-electric, NN), which together determine the total output of an 
economy according to a nested CES (constant elasticity of substitution) production 
function.  
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The core of the energy module is a comparatively simple Reference Energy System 
(RES) describing the technological options available to supply the energy needed as a 
production factor.  
 
The climate module takes greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, converting them 
systematically into atmospheric GHG concentrations and temperature change. The 
equations for calculating the radiative forcing and the temperature change are derived 
from the IPCC Third Assessment Report [11]. For CO2, the radiative forcing is 
proportional to the logarithm of the ratio of the current to initial level of atmospheric 
concentrations. The outputs of the climate module include trajectories of GHG 
emissions, atmospheric concentrations, and temperature change.  
 
The information flow through the model is depicted in Figure 10.  
 
 
Figure 10: An overview of MERGE. 
 
MERGE was designed as an integrated-assessment model (IAM) to study global GHG 
mitigation scenarios and to conduct cost-benefit analysis. In order to use MERGE to 
make a first step towards analyzing the economic consequences of the Kyoto Protocol 
for Russia, IIASA-ECS extended the original MERGE 5 model. The main parts of the 
extension were the splitting of two original MERGE regions into five new world 
regions, the improved treatment of non-CO2 GHGs, and the inclusion of the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). To distinguish the new version from the original 
model, we use the name MERGE 5I (‘I’ as in IIASA) for the new version. 
 
In the original MERGE 5, Canada belongs to the model region CANZ (Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand) and Eastern Europe to EEFSU (Eastern Europe and Former 
Soviet Union). Since Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union play separate roles in 
this study and Australia did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, these two world regions were 
split in the following way: In view of the small share of New Zealand’s 1990 emissions 
in total CANZ emissions, we decided to split CANZ into Canada and ANZ (Australia 
and New Zealand). The split of EEFSU into the three parts, EEU (Eastern Europe), 
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RUS (Russia), and NRFSU (other FSU) was obvious. The years 2007 and 2012 were 
also added. 
 
In the original MERGE 5, data on CO2, CH4, N2O, SLF and LLF are included. This 
means that the three “Kyoto gases” HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 have been combined under 
the two categories SLF and LLF, that is, short-lived fluorinated gases (SLF) and long-
lived fluorinated gases (LLF). Most emissions of the four non-CO2 greenhouse gases 
are not related to the energy system. They are therefore given as external inputs to 
MERGE with the exception of CH4 leakage resulting from natural gas production, 
which is treated endogenously. For each gas, 11 abatement cost categories and 
abatement volumes are defined in the form of step functions.   
 
In the original MERGE 5, the emissions of these gases are used to calculate global 
temperature change, but only CO2 emissions (and their abatement) are used to model the 
Kyoto Protocol. In MERGE 5I, the model was modified so that now, all five GHG 
categories, their abatement options, and CH4 leakage are included in the modeling of the 
Kyoto Protocol. Also, the forest management thresholds (sinks) as given in Appendix Z 
of the Marrakech Accord [16] were included so that sequestration from forest 
management can only be accounted for until the thresholds of Appendix Z are reached. 
This may be important for competent readers. 
4.2 Limiting cases and definition of GDP loss  
To analyze consequences of different geopolitical scenarios guiding the implementation 
of the Kyoto Protocol for Russia, we consider two “limiting cases”. Our reference case, 
R0, assumes no GHG emission constraints.  
 
The second limiting case, R1, assumes that the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol comply 
with their “Kyoto limits” using domestic measures only. In this limiting case, we follow 
a hypothetic “Kyoto forever” scenario by extending the Kyoto constraints until the end 
of the 21
st
 century.  
 
The so-called “Full trade” case, was supposed to be implemented as the next step in our 
analysis.  
 
We define the country’s GDP loss to be the arithmetic difference between its GDP in 
the reference case, GDP(R0), and that in the domestic measures case, GDP(R1), and use 
notation GDPLoss to refer to it: 
 
)1()0( RGDPRGDPGDPLoss    
 
This indicator shows the value of GDP that the country will lose or gain as a 
consequence of observing the Kyoto limits.  
 
Note that even in the R1 case implying the use of domestic measures only; Russia’s 
GDP depends on the development of the E3 system in other world regions. For 
example, a possible decrease in Western Europe’s GDP due to observing the Kyoto 
constraints would affect energy imports from Russia, which in turn will result in a slight 
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decrease in Russia’s GDPLoss. Moreover, fluctuations in GDPLoss’s values over time 
are expected to occur in our scenarios. One of the most distinctive results of our model 
runs is the point in time at which these fluctuations switch to a clear tendency to growth 
the GDP loss. This point in time describes a situation, in which Russia will have 
exhausted its energy efficiency potential (“hot air”), and a process of restructuring the 
industry and energy sectors towards a low-emission system will be initiated.  
4.3 MERGE-5I scenarios for Russia 
The main aim of our numerical experiment is to compare the temporal dynamics of 
important output MERGE-5I variables for Russia and the expert forecasting estimates 
by the Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences [14], which will  
be referred to as “the expert” further on in this section. The indices under investigation 
include the sizes of Russia’s CO2 emissions, GDP, TPES (Total Primary Energy 
Supply), and the structure of TPES.  
 
We consider four scenarios for development of Russia’s economy and energy sectors in 
the period 2005–2020: a Reference Scenario and three scenarios based on estimates 
from Russian sources.  
 
A brief description of the scenarios is as follows:  
 
1. The Reference Scenario (REF) rests upon a standard set of values assigned in 
MERGE-5I and incorporates the forecasts for Russia, suggested by the Energy 
Information Administration [15]. REF assumes that Russia’s annual GDP 
growth rate declines gradually from 4.5% in 2005 to 3.4% in 2020, and the 
energy efficiency improvement rate declines from 4.0% in 2005 to 2.4% in 
2020, per year. The gas leakage level is assumed to decrease by 20% per decade. 
 
2. In the Governmental Scenario (GOV), the annual GDP growth rate is fixed at 
the level of 6.2% for 2005–2020 (this corresponds to the RF Government’s 
forecast for Russia’s annual growth). The energy efficiency improvement rate 
declines from 5.3% in 2005 to 4.1% in 2020, per year. In both GOV and REF 
scenarios, indicator AEEI is calculated on the base of Arnulf Grübler’s 
assumption adopted in MERGE-5I [17]. The same assumption on gas leakage as 
in REF scenario is adopted. 
 
3. The Doubling Russia’s GDP within 10 Years Scenario (DBL) illustrates the 
goal, announced by President V.V. Putin, to double Russia’s GDP within 
10 years. This goal being translated into an annual average GDP growth rate in 
Russia gives 7.2%. The rate of energy efficiency improvement is set at the level 
of 2.0% per year. In addition, the DBL scenario assumes no improvement on gas 
leakage since 2000.  
 
4. In the Pessimistic Scenario (PES), the annual average GDP growth rate is fixed 
at the level of 4.5% for 2005–2020. The energy efficiency improvement rate is 
fixed at the level of 2.0% per year. The same assumption on gas leakage as in 
DBL scenario is adopted.   
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Table 5 summarizes the key features of the scenarios. 
 
Table 5: MERGE-5I scenarios. 
 
  
Scenario REF 
 
 
Scenario GOV 
 
Scenario DBL 
 
Scenario PES 
GDP growth rates 
 
4.5-3.4% 
 
 
6.2% 
 
 
7.2% 
 
4.5% 
Energy efficiency 
improvement rate 
 
4.0–2.4% 
 
5.3–2.1% 
 
2.0% 
 
2.0% 
 
 
From the perspective of emission reduction, the REF scenario and GOV scenario can be 
viewed as rather favourable ones; they assume relatively high energy efficiency 
improvement rates and medium and, respectively, quite high GDP growth rates for 
Russia. The DBL and PES scenarios assuming low energy efficiency improvement rates 
and quite high (in the case of the DBL scenario, very high) GDP growth rates are less 
favourable in this context.  Note that the PES scenario assuming, roughly, the same 
GDP growth rate as the REF scenario, suggests, in a sense a less energy efficient variant 
of the latter scenario. Moreover, in the PES scenario, some of the macroeconomic 
parameters for Russia are defined to be “less favourable” for the country than in the 
other scenarios. Table 6 shows the values of some macroeconomic parameters for 
Russia, used for simulation. 
 
Table 6: The values of some macroeconomic parameters for Russia used for simulation. 
 
Scenario Capital value share 
Elastisity of substitution 
between capital-labor, 
and electric-nonelectric 
energy pairs
Reference price of non-
electric energy 
(USD per GJ) 
REF 0.3 0.4 2.5 
GOV 0.3 0.4 2.5 
DBL 0.3 0.4 2.5 
PES 0.33 0.35 5 
4.4 Emission projections  
Here we compare the temporal dynamics of key output MERGE-5I variables for Russia 
in the four scenarios described above, and the expert forecasting estimates [14] (note 
that in this section “the expert” is the Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy 
of Sciences). 
 
In Figures 11-17, the expert forecast is marked «forecast» or «expert estimation» and 
the modeling results corresponding to the scenarios are denoted by the abbreviations 
used for the scenarios: REF, GOV, DBL (or DOUBLE) and PES, respectively. Each 
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scenario is implemented in cases R0 and R1 with identical input parameters. Recall that 
case R0 does not suggest any GHG emission constraints, and case R1 assumes that 
GHG emission reductions in the world regions bound by the Kyoto Protocol are 
achieved using domestic measures only.  
 
In Figure 11 we see that in case R0 the expert forecast and scenarios REF and GOV 
suggest that Russia’s CO2 emissions do not reach the level of 1990 (the Kyoto level for 
Russia) even in 2020, whereas for scenarios DBL and PES the Kyoto level is reached 
before the end of the First Kyoto Commitment Period – the year 2012. Considering a 
radical difference in the behaviors of the simulated emission trajectories for scenarios 
REF and PES in case R0, we come to a remarkable qualitative observation. Note that 
(Table 5) both the REF and PES scenarios assume roughly the same (medium-size) 
GDP growth in Russia, whereas these scenarios essentially differ in assumptions on the 
energy efficiency growth rates in Russia: a drift from 4.0% to 2.1% in scenario REF 
opposes 2.0% in scenario PES (here we neglect the differences in the values of some 
macroeconomic parameters in scenarios REF and PES, given in Table 6). We see 
therefore that a strong and timely increase in the country’s energy efficiency 
improvement rate (“a switch from PES to REF”) can radically improve its medium-term 
emission trajectories and, in particular, shift the time of crossing the Kyoto level from 
the beginning of the First Kyoto Commitment Period to far beyond it. 
 
 
Figure 11: Russia’s CO2 emissions in Gt of carbon equivalent; for the four  
MERGE-5I scenarios in case R0 (no emission constraints).  
 
Also, Figure 11 shows us that in case R1, Russia’s Kyoto level remains high above its 
simulated medium-term emission trajectory for each of our four scenarios. In this 
context, it is remarkable that the implementation of domestic measures for reducing 
emissions by all Kyoto Parties drastically improves Russia’s emission trajectories even 
in the most non-favorable scenarios, DBL and PES, assuming that Russia crosses its 
Kyoto level before the end of the First Kyoto Commitment Period in case R0. 
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Finally, Figure 11 demonstrates that in case R1 the diversification in Russia’s emission 
trajectories across the scenarios is significantly lower than in case R0, which, 
principally shows that in the case of Russia, the implementation of domestic measures 
for reducing emissions by all Kyoto Parties may act as a strong factor for raising the 
robustness of the country’s output emission trajectory with respect to fluctuations in 
parameters of its economic development. 
 
In Table 7 we bring together the estimates for the years Russia’s reaches its Kyoto 
(1990) emission level, as suggested by the Third National Communication of the 
Russian Federation (TNC-RF), the Institute of Economic Analysis in Moscow (IEA), 
and by our group. Table 7 is based on Tables 3, 4 and 5, and on Figures 8, 9 and 11. 
 
Table 7: The years, in which Russia reaches its Kyoto (1990) carbon emissions level in 
case R0; estimates by the Third National Communication of the Russian Federation 
(TNC-RF), Institute of Economic Analysis, Moscow (IEA), and MERGE-5I. 
 
 
 
TNC-RF IEA MERGE-5I 
 Scenarios Scenarios Scenarios 
 
I II III 1 2 3 4 REF GOV DBL PES 
 
GDP  
growth rate 
 
 
5.2% 
 
3.3% 
 
4.5% 
 
5.0% 
 
6.2% 
 
6.7% 
 
7.2% 
 
4.5%-
3.4% 
 
6.2% 
 
7.2% 
 
4.5% 
Energy 
efficiency 
improvement 
rate 
 
3.7% 
 
2.5% 
 
2.0% 
 
2.0% 
 
2.0% 
 
2.0% 
 
2.0% 
 
4.0%-
2.4% 
 
5.3%-
4.1% 
 
2.0% 
 
2.0% 
Year of 
reaching 
1990 
emission 
level 
(before 
2020) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
2015 
 
2011 
 
2009 
 
2008 
 
2007 
 
- 
 
- 
 
2008 
 
2006 
 
The results summarized in Table 7 are, in general, mutually complementary rather than 
inconsistent. The TNC-RF and IEA give their estimates for two non-intersecting 
intervals of medium-size and relatively high GDP growth rates in Russia, respectively, 
and in this sense complement each other. Here, we see that Russia’s critical year (the 
year, in which it reaches its 1990 emission level) moves backward while the assumed 
GDP growth rate in Russia increases.  Note that the TNC-RF’s estimate for Russia’s 
critical year in Scenario III, 2015, indicates (in combination with the outcomes for 
Scenarios I and II) that lowering the energy efficiency improvement rate can rapidly 
shift Russia’s critical year backwards. 
  
In Table 7, our (MERGE-5I) assumptions on the country’s GDP growth rates and 
energy efficiency improvement rates partially intersect, to some extent, with those by 
the TNC-RF and IEA and partially complement them. Our REF scenario is quite close 
to the TNC-RF’s Scenario I, and in both scenarios Russia’s critical year falls beyond 
2020. Our DBL scenario is similar to the IEA’s Scenario 4 and these two scenarios 
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suggest roughly similar estimates for Russia’s critical year (the years 2008 and 2007 in 
the former and latter scenarios, respectively). In these two situations the final estimates 
obtained independently, based on two different methodologies practically coincide and 
thus support each other.  
 
In Table 7, our REF scenario relates to the IEA’s Scenario 1 very much like the TNC-
RF’s Scenario I does: assuming approximately the same GDP growth rate as in the 
IEA’s Scenario 1, the REF scenario suggests a higher energy efficiency improvement 
rate for Russia. Here, we see the effect we noticed earlier in the relationship between the 
TNC-RF’s Scenario I and the IEA’s Scenario 1: lowering the energy efficiency 
improvement rate (from the value assumed in IEA’s Scenario 1 to the one assumed in 
our REF scenario) can rapidly shift Russia’s critical year backwards. We arrive at the 
same effect if we compare our GOV scenario and the IEA’s Scenario 2.  
 
Table 7 shows also a pair of seemingly inconsistent estimates: the TNC-RF’s 
Scenario III and our PES scenario assume similar GDP growth rates and similar energy 
efficiency improvement rates for Russia, and suggest different estimates for Russia’s 
critical year: 2015 (in the TNC-RF’s Scenario III) and 2006 (in the PES scenario). 
Understanding the reasons for this discrepancy requires a deeper analysis of similarities 
and dissimilarities in the assumptions and methodologies used by the TNC-RF and by 
our group. One of the possible reasons could be a non-standard set of macroeconomic 
parameter values in scenario PES (see Table 6).  
4.5 GDP loss 
In Figure 12 we see that for all modeling scenarios under our model assumptions, in the 
period before the year 2020, Russia’s GDP loss grows at approximately constant rates, 
which essentially differ. In scenario REF and in scenario GOV, the growth rates of 
Russia’s GDP loss are insignificant and reach no more than 2% in the end of the period, 
whereas in scenario DBL and in scenario PES this indicator is approximately five times 
higher and exceeds 12% by the end of the period. Thus, the latter two scenarios turn out 
to be much less favorable for the country in terms of both the time of crossing the Kyoto 
level in case R0 (Figure 11) and GDP loss caused by a switch from case R0 to case R1.  
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Figure 12: Russia’s GDP loss, GDPLoss, due to the implementation of domestic 
abatement measures in trln. year-2000 USD (left) and as a percentage of GDP (right). 
4.6 Energy sector 
In Figure 13, we present the simulated temporal dynamics of Russia’s Total Primary 
Energy Supply (TPES) and the expert forecast for TPES. It is evident that the expert 
forecast for TPES is much closer to the simulation results for scenarios DBL and PES 
than for scenarios GOV and REF. Note that the perspectives for Russian power 
engineering from the viewpoint of the Energy Information Administration and from the 
viewpoint of Russian experts are essentially different (e.g. the energy supply in 2020 for 
scenario DBL is almost twice the size of scenario REF) [13, 15]. 
 
Figure 13: Russia’s Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES, both electric and  
non-electric, in EJ), case R0 (no emission constraints). 
 
Analyzing the structure of the energy sector of Russia (Figure 14), we see that at least 
till 2020, natural gas plays a definitive role in Russia’s TPES for all the model scenarios 
as well according to the expert forecast. For the model scenarios, its share in 2020 is 
larger than 50%. The share of oil and coal (existing processing technologies) decreases 
in time for all scenarios. Further calculations demonstrate a sharp fall in shares of these 
resources, which can be explained by reserve depletion. One can expect that in a time 
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perspective, new coal processing technologies and renewable energy sources will come 
to the forefront.  
 
Note that the model dynamics presented in Figures 11–14 is optimal (as suggested by 
MERGE-5I) on the whole time interval; this fact may be a reason for the deviations of 
the modeling results from the expert forecast at specific moments. However, 
summarizing the results presented above (see Figures 11–14), we can conclude that the 
expert forecast holds an intermediate position between the modeling results for 
scenarios DBL and GOV. 
 
 
Figure 14: Russia’s TPES structure (fuel mix) for the four 
MERGE-5I scenarios in case R0 (no emission constraints). 
 
 
To study the dynamics of the structure of Russia’s energy sector and world-regional 
primary-energy exports by Russia, we choose scenario GOV, which, on the one hand, 
reflects the Russian governmental forecast for the country’s economic development, and 
on the other hand, as follows from aforementioned, is close to the expert estimates.  
 
MERGE-5I suggests two energy categories – electric energy and non-electric energy. 
According to the basic model scenario, REF, global electricity demand grows 
approximately sixfold in the 21
st
 century – from 49 EJ in 2000 to almost 300 EJ in 
2100. This corresponds to an average annual growth rate of 1.8%. Total demand for 
non-electric energy in the 21
st
 century grows at a significantly slower pace than that for 
electricity, it roughly triples from 250 to 740 EJ, which corresponds to an average 
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annual growth rate of 1.1%. The modeling results for scenario GOV in case R0 (no 
emission constraints) are presented in Figures 15, 16.  
 
Figure 15: The dynamics of the electric energy mix in Russia, scenario GOV,  
case R0 (no emission constraints). 
 
Figure 16: The dynamics of the non-electric energy mix in Russia, scenario GOV,  
case R0 (no emission constraints). 
 
We see from the figures that Russia’s electricity demand for the GOV scenario grows 
from 2.57 EJ in 2000 to 13.64 EJ in 2100 (corresponding to an average annual growth 
rate of 1.7%), and demand for non-electric energy grows from 16.1 to 25.1 EJ 
(corresponding to an average annual growth rate of 0.45%). These rates are comparable 
with those for global demands simulated by MERGE. We can also observe other 
tendencies similar to the global behavior. The generation of the electricity mix is 
characterized by hydro and nuclear keeping their absolute contributions at almost 
constant levels. In the early years, their combined share is significant and it falls below 
10% in 2100 (down from 42% in 2000). Natural gas plays a bridging role in Russia. Its 
contribution to electricity generation peaks around the middle of the century and then 
declines as a consequence of resource constraints. In the long run, new coal is the fuel 
of choice for electricity production. Russia’s non-electric energy mix rests on a constant 
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base (2.6 EJ) supplied by coal and its thermal uses. Oil and natural gas increase their 
dominance until the middle of the century, when resource constraints on these two fossil 
fuels begin to push renewable energy into the market. 
 
The simulated dynamics of world-regional primary-energy (namely, oil and gas) exports 
by Russia for the GOV scenario in cases R0 and R1 is shown in Figure 17. We see 
starting from 2055 Russia’s gas export in case R1 is smaller than in case R0, which can 
be explained by the fact that Russia’s internal need for a less carbon-intensive fuel 
increases as a result of the implementation of  the Kyoto constraints.  
 
Figure 17: Oil and gas exports by Russia in trln. year-2000 USD, scenario GOV, cases 
R0 (no emission constraints) and R1 (domestic measures for emission constraints). 
5 Sensitivity Analysis 
In our numerical analysis demonstrated in Section 4, the MERGE-5I model is 
configured based on a set of standard reference parameter values [8, 9], which may, 
generally, be inaccurate due to various types of uncertainties in data and in experts’ 
estimates. While taking possible inaccuracies of that kind into account, we found that 
the sensitivity of our estimates to variations is the values of some of the model 
parameters. 
Here we show the results of our analysis of the sensitivity of Russia’s GDP loss to the 
variations of the following major model parameters for Russia: 
ESUB  capital value share (optimal value share of capital in the capital-labor aggregate) 
KPVS  electric value share (optimal value share of electricity in the energy aggregate) 
ELVS elasticity of substitution between capital-labor and energy aggregates 
AEEI energy efficiency improvement rate  
KGDP initial capital-to-GDP ratio 
DEPR annual depreciation rate  
INTPR international oil price 
OGPD oil-gas price differential 
PNREF reference price of non-electric energy 
DECF maximal annual decline factor for the capacities of electric and non-electric technologies 
NSHF maximal market share for electric and non-electric technologies 
REIS coefficients describing the energy-intensive sectors 
ABMLT parameters quantifying restrictions on abatement measures, namely, abatement quantity 
multipliers 
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ABLIM abatement limits at alterative cost levels 
AppendixZ limits on sinks forestation 
 
We varied each parameter value, V, within the interval [0.7V0, 1.3V0] with a step size of 
0.1V0, where V0 is the initial reference parameter value. An exception was parameter 
DECF whose reference value was 0.98. We varied the DECF values within the interval 
[0.9, 1.0] with a step size of 0.01. Let us note in passing that changing PNREF 
(reference price of non-electric energy) requires an appropriate change of PEREF 
(reference price of electric energy) as well. 
  
For each parameter, V, and for each time period, TP, we find an instant sensitivity of 
Russia’s GDP loss in period TP to variations in V, IS(V,TP), as the maximum over all 
Vis, the perturbed values of V within the chosen grid in the predefined variance interval, 
of the deviation of the value of Russia’s GDP loss in period TP for the perturbed 
parameter value Vi, GDPLoss(Vi,TP), from that for the reference value V0, 
GDPLoss(V0,TP), related to the reference value of the country’s GDP in this period, 
GDP(V0,TP): 
),(
),(),(
max),(
0
0
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
 
Given an initial time period, ITP, and a final time period, FTP, we find a global 
sensitivity of Russia’s GDP loss over the time interval [IP,FP] to variations in V, GS(V, 
[ITP,FTP]), as the maximum of the absolute values of the instant sensitivity IS(V,TP) 
overall TPs located between ITP and FTP:  
 
|),(|max]),[,( TPVISFTPITPVGS FTPTPITP   
 
Figure 18 shows the values for the global sensitivities of Russia’s GDP loss over the 
time intervals [IP,FP] for scenario REF as functions of the final time period, FP, 
running from the initial time period, IP, the year 2005, to the year 2100.  
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Figure 18: The global sensitivities of Russia’s GDP loss over the time intervals [IP,FP] 
as functions of the final time period, FP, running from the initial time period, IP, 
the year 2005, to the year 2100; scenario REF. 
 
Figure 19 displays the shares of the individual global sensitivities of Russia’s GDP Loss 
GS(V,[ITP,FTP]) over the time intervals [ITP,FTP] = [2005,2010] and [ITP,FTP] = 
[2005,2080] in the overall global sensitivities on these intervals.  
 
Figure 19: The shares of the individual global sensitivities of Russia’s GDP Loss  
over the time intervals 2005–2010 and 2005–2080 in the overall  
global sensitivities on these intervals; scenario REF. 
Figures 18 and 19 show the degree, to which each of the varied parameters influences 
the values of Russia’s GDP loss. We see that Russia’s GDP loss is most sensitive to 
variations in the energy efficiency improvement rate (AEEI) and capital value share 
(KPVS), whereas it is strongly robust to variations in ABLIM, ABMLT, Appendix Z, 
INTPR, ESUB, NSHF and REIS. The latter robustness property reveals the constraints 
that may not be binding for the country. 
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